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The Swedish adult education program called Knowledge Lift is unprece-
dented in its size and scope, aiming to raise the skill level of all low-skilled
workers towards the medium level. This paper evaluates the eﬀects of pro-
gram participation on individual labor market outcomes, notably employ-
ment and annual income, as well as on the labor market equilibrium. For
the eﬀects at the individual level we apply ﬁxed eﬀect methods allowing
for treatment eﬀect heterogeneity. The data are based on a number of
matched longitudinal administrative data sets covering the full population
of Sweden. For the equilibrium eﬀects we analyze an equilibrium search
model with heterogeneous worker skills. This model is calibrated using
pre-program observations.
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Life-long learning, adult education, and employability have become focal points
in the labor market policies of many advanced economies (see e.g. the recent
OECD Employment Outlook 2004). It is expected that these economies will face
more turbulent conditions than in the past, and that the development of novel
production technologies will proceed at a sustained high speed. This would then
require a ﬂexible and suitably skilled workforce. Indeed, the role of low-educated
workers has diminished in the modern knowledge-based economy. The fact that
the age structure changes towards a heavier representation of older workers means
that the human capital adjustment needs to be made by the existing stock of
workers instead of the inﬂow of new workers.
Sweden is relatively well prepared for a policy intervention to accommodate
these adjustments, given its long tradition of training of adult unemployed work-
ers (see e.g. Ministry of Education, 1998, Friberg, 2000, and Ministry of Indus-
try, 2001). In 1997, Sweden implemented a new major adult education program
called the “Adult Education Initiative” or “Knowledge Lift” (henceforth denoted
as KL). Without exaggeration, this constitutes the largest and most ambitious
skill raising program ever. It aims to raise the skill level of all low-skilled workers
to the medium skill level. It focuses on workers with a low level of education. The
size of the program is unprecedented: in the period 1997-2000, more than 10% of
the whole labor force has participated in it.
Obviously, the program reﬂects a great deal of optimism about the extent
to which an adult individual’s human capital can be improved. The empirical
literature on training programs for unemployed workers does not warrant this
optimism. The general conclusion from this literature is that training does not
have large eﬀects on the individual’s labor market outcomes (see e.g. Fay, 1996,
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999, and Martin and Grubb, 2001). A major
exception concerns training for women who return to the labor market after a
spell of child-raising activity, who clearly form an important target group for
adult education. However, perhaps more importantly, training participants with
a low initial level of education beneﬁt even less than other educational groups.
In this paper we analyze the eﬀects of KL. The paper consists of two parts. In
the ﬁrst part we estimate the eﬀects on individual outcomes, notably income and
employment. In the second part we calibrate the eﬀects on labor market equilib-
rium, using an equilibrium matching model with labor market imperfections and
skill heterogeneity.
For the empirical analyses, we use a rather unique set of longitudinal admin-
1istrative data which contains the full population of individuals in Sweden. The
dataset matches detailed records from employment oﬃces, unemployment insur-
ance agencies, the income tax agency, and the adult education register. The latter
contains records of all adult education courses that are followed.
Longitudinal data on individual training program participation often display a
pre-program earnings (or Ashenfelter’s) dip (see e.g. Heckman and Smith, 1999,
for an exposition). Our data display prolonged pre- and post-program dips in
earnings as well as employment rates. It is therefore essential to use data with a
suﬃciently long time span (in our case, 1991–2000). We estimate average treat-
ment eﬀects on the treated, and we focus on two outcome variables: annual
earnings, and employment. We apply ﬁxed eﬀect estimation methods, notably
conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences and conditional probit.
Given the size of the program, equilibrium eﬀects are likely to be substan-
tial. In addition to the eﬀect on the individuals in the program, other workers in
the economy are likely to be impacted through changes in wages and/or through
changes in unemployment and employment probabilities.1 We analyze the equi-
librium eﬀects of the knowledge lift by calibrating an equilibrium model of the
labor market. Obviously, such a model needs to incorporate skill heterogeneity
and equilibrium unemployment. Also, ﬁrms should be able to choose their pro-
duction technology in the face of the prevailing skill distribution. We use a model
based on Albrecht and Vroman (2002), which is arguably the most concise and
amenable model satisfying the above requirements. It assumes two worker types,
low skill and medium skill, with the number of workers of each type taken as
exogenous in a given market. There are frictions in the process by which unem-
ployed workers and vacancies contact one another, and the surplus generated by a
worker/job match is divided using the Nash bargaining solution. The ﬂow output
of a match depends on the skill level of the worker as well as on the job type as
decided by the ﬁrm when it created the vacancy.
We use macro data from 1996 to calibrate the pre-knowledge lift economy.
This allows us to set values for the unobserved parameters that drive the theo-
retical model. We then address the question: “Suppose the knowledge lift were to
change the skill distribution in the economy in a particular way. Using the cal-
ibrated economy as a base, what would be the eﬀects?” Speciﬁcally, we impute
the post-KL skill distribution into the model and solve for the new steady-state
equilibrium. We derive the wages for low-skill and medium-skill workers as well
as their unemployment rates and employment in low-skill and medium-skill jobs.
1See e.g. Lise, Seitz and Smith (2002) for a general discussion of equilibrium evaluation of
policy programs.
2We also derive the overall unemployment rate, labor market tightness (vacancies
over unemployment), the proportions of low-skill and medium-skill vacancies, and
the equilibrium eﬀects on the treated.
Bj¨ orklund et al. (2004) show that KL generated a large ﬂow of teachers from
regular secondary education to adult education, and they argue that KL there-
fore may have generated substantial negative external eﬀects on the quality of
regular education. Such eﬀects increase the social costs of the program beyond
the amounts given below. However, addressing them would be beyond the scope
of the present paper. We also do not aim to address the use of adult education by
young individuals who left the regular school system with low educational levels,
as a short-cut towards regular university education (see e.g. Bj¨ orklund et al.,
2004, and Ekstr¨ om, 2003, for discussions). For this reason we exclude individuals
aged below 25.
To date, a few studies have examined eﬀects of adult education in Sweden on
individual labor market outcomes. Ekstr¨ om (2003) estimates the eﬀect on annual
income of following adult education in the (pre-KL) early 1990s, using diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences. She ﬁnds no positive income eﬀects for either gender. A series of
studies has compared individual labor market outcomes between unemployed in-
dividuals who enrol in KL and unemployed individuals who enrol in labor market
training, using propensity score matching or IV methods (see e.g. Axelsson and
Westerlund, 1999, and Stenberg, 2003). The results depend strongly on the out-
come measure, the evaluation method, and the type of labor market training and
sub-population considered.
Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (2003) estimate eﬀects of adult education
using a sample of displaced prime-aged workers in the US. They ﬁnd sizable
returns. However, as Bj¨ orklund et al. (2004) argue, generalizing from evidence on
US adult education programs is diﬃcult because there are so many low-skilled
individuals in the US, many of whom may have had insuﬃcient human capital
investment opportunities earlier in life. Indeed, the skill distribution in Sweden
is more compressed than in the US (see Bj¨ orklund et al., 2004, for an exposition
on this).
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the KL program
and the data, respectively. In Section 4 we describe the empirical approaches
that we employ to study the eﬀects on individual outcomes, and we present the
estimation results. We also report the sensitivity of the results with respect to a
number of assumptions concerning the construction of the variables of interest.
Section 5 contains the results of the equilibrium analyses, and Section 6 concludes.
32 The Knowledge Lift
As explained below, KL was run through the existing municipal adult education
system (KOMVUX) and can be seen as a major qualitative and quantitative
upscaling of KOMVUX. By now, many studies provide detailed descriptions of
KL and/or KOMVUX and their participants. See, for example, The National
Agency for Education (1999), Axelsson and Westerlund (1999), Skolverket (2001),
and Stenberg (2003) for information on KL, and Skolverket (2001) and Ekstr¨ om
(2003) for information on KOMVUX. We therefore restrict ourselves here to a
brief summary.
KL is by far the largest adult education program ever in Sweden. It ran from
July 1, 1997 to December 31, 2002 (and was followed by a permanent expansion
of the number of seats in KOMVUX). The objective is to increase the skill level
of adult low-skilled workers to the medium skill level, thereby helping these indi-
viduals to strengthen their position in the labor market. Here, low skilled means
having an educational attainment below the level of a 3-year “gymnasium” de-
gree, while medium skilled means having attained this level but not any levels
beyond that. The 3-year “gymnasium” degree roughly corresponds to the upper
secondary education level or senior high school. Since 1995 this is the lowest pos-
sible upper secondary school diploma, whereas before that many individuals left
high school with a 2-year degree. The program particularly targets unemployed
adult low-skilled workers. In fact, low-skilled employed individuals and medium-
skilled unemployed individuals are also often eligible for KL, and the enrollees
contain many low-skilled employed workers, working part-time or full-time.
Like KOMVUX, KL focuses on the enhancement of general skills (for exam-
ple, English, Swedish, and mathematics), as opposed to speciﬁc skills needed for
particular professions. However, part of KL can be spent in vocational courses and
work placements. In principle it is possible to combine upper secondary courses
with studies at an elementary level or with a program organized by the National
Labor Market Board for the unemployed. The curricula and grade criteria for the
attainment of the medium skill level are roughly the same as in the regular upper
secondary education system.
KL is organized at the municipal level, and is run through the KOMVUX
system. The organization may be joint with other municipalities. A municipality
may purchase the services of education providers and/or cooperate with them.
However, the municipalities are responsible for admission into KL. A single course
typically starts twice a year and covers a half-year term.
At the level of the individual, admission into KL and KOMVUX is in principle
4free. The underlying view is that KL participation must be led by the demand for
education by the individual. A participant should have ample scope for personal
choice regarding the type of study and its timing and location. Whether one can
participate in a desired course only depends on the availability of courses and on
the entry skill level requirement. Recruitment of participants is sometimes carried
out in cooperation with trade union organizations or local employment oﬃces.
KL and KOMVUX participants may be eligible for a range of income grants
and ﬁnancial study support measures. Some enrollees receive “special education
support” (UBS). The amount of ﬁnancial support is equivalent to UI. UBS is only
given to KL participants who are entitled to unemployment insurance (UI) pay-
ments at date of entry into the program. Moreover, the worker must be between
25–55 years old inclusive at date of entry into the program and must study at
elementary or upper secondary level. The grant is typically given for a maximum
of one year. Sometimes, special adult study assistance and funding are available
as a combination of a grant and a loan. Many participants rely on other ﬁnancial
resources. An individual who is full-time in KL/KOMVUX is considered to be
out of the labor force unless he/she earns income on the side.
The state channels funds to the municipalities to ﬁnance KL and KOMVUX.
The amount of funding depends on the municipality’s unemployment rate and
skill level distribution, and on the scope of the municipality’s program. As a
conservative estimate, in the ﬁrst years of its existence, the state spent at least
SEK 3.5 billion (US $ 350M) per year on KL. This almost equals SEK 1000
per labor force participant in Sweden. The spending covers the creation of some
100,000 annual study slots. In practice the funding was more than suﬃcient to
meet the demand for KL (see Statskontoret, 1999). This fact is important for our
analyses because it implies that there was no quantity rationing.
The following gives an indication of the size of the program in terms of num-
bers of enrollees. In the fall of 1997, 538,004 individuals (out of a population
of 8M) were (i) aged between 25 and 55, and (ii) participated in the municipal
adult education, or were unemployed (in the sense of actively searching), or par-
ticipated in one or more training programs. About 220,000 of these participated
in KL and/or KOMVUX, and of these about 56,000 received UBS. About 35,000
KL/KOMVUX participants were registered as unemployed, and another 5,000
participated both in KL/KOMVUX and in employment training. The number of
registered unemployed, including those participating in KOMVUX and/or train-
ing programs was about 330,000. For comparison, the number of pupils in regular
upper secondary school was about 300,000, while the number of individuals par-
ticipating in employment training programs was about 40,000. The ﬁgures do
5not sum to the total of 538,004 because some individuals fall into more than
one category. Typically, the number of individuals enrolled in KL/KOMVUX is
about 50% larger than the full-time equivalent of the number of occupied slots.
This indicates that many enrollees are part-time participants. Skolverket (2001)
provides a wealth of additional information on the composition of participants
and courses.
Due to KL, the number of individuals enrolled in adult education became
dramatically larger than in earlier years (the increase in the stock of participants
was about 80%). The KL initiative also involved the improvement and modern-
ization of teaching methodologies and pedagogy. For all means and purposes, KL
and KOMVUX are indistinguishable in the period in which KL ran. Therefore,
in the remainder of the paper, we often simply refer to KOMVUX as the pro-
gram we evaluate, where it should be kept in mind that we evaluate it over the
KL period, and it should be emphasized that the existing KOMVUX program
includes courses that do not aim at the attainment of a medium skill level but
rather an improvement within the class of low skill sublevels.
3 The data
3.1 The data registers
Our dataset is built on a random sample of 200,000 individuals from the popu-
lation of inhabitants aged between 16 and 65 in Sweden on December 31, 1997.
These individuals have been longitudinally traced in four diﬀerent administrative
registers covering (subsets of) the period 1990–2000. Our dataset matches the
records of individuals across these registers.
The ﬁrst register is the oﬃcial Swedish register of income and wealth, called
RAMS. It is obtained from yearly income tax declarations for the years 1990–2000.
This includes information from the population register, which is used to create the
sample. The register provides observations of various types of income that each
individual may receive, on an annual basis. Speciﬁcally, we observe individual
wage incomes, incomes in the form of government subsidies (including UBS), and
income from self-employment. The RAMS data also provide information on some
individual characteristics.
The second register (AKSTAT) is from the unemployment insurance fund.
It provides information on the amount of unemployment beneﬁts compensation
that is received, on a weekly basis. Together, AKSTAT and RAMS enable the
construction of our measure of annual earnings or income for the years 1990–2000.
6This equals the sum of all above-mentioned incomes in RAMS plus unemploy-
ment beneﬁts income (all before income taxes). However, the AKSTAT data from
before 1994 are not fully reliable.
The third register is the so-called H¨ ANDEL dataset, which is based on reg-
isters at the employment oﬃce and is compiled by the Swedish Labor Market
Board. It contains all individuals who ever registered as unemployed as of Septem-
ber 1991. Registration is voluntary but is required in order to receive or apply for
unemployment compensation or to participate in any type of labor market pro-
gram, so in fact almost all unemployed are in these data (according to Carling,
Holmlund and Vejsiu, 2001, more than 90% of the individuals who are ILO-
unemployed according to labor force surveys also register at the employment
oﬃces).
The H¨ ANDEL data provide labor market histories for all its individuals on a
daily basis, with dates of transitions between diﬀerent labor market states and
between open unemployment and participation in training programs and work
experience programs. However, because participation in KL is regarded as an
out-of-the-labor-force activity, H¨ ANDEL by itself does not allow for observation
of spells of KL participation. The H¨ ANDEL data also provide individual charac-
teristics.
The fourth register (KOMVUX) concerns individual records on participation
in any adult education program. These data are available for the years 1990–2000.
From this we can follow participation in adult education on a basis of six-month
periods at the individual level. Therefore, for all individuals for all semesters
there is a speciﬁc variable which says whether someone has been in KOMVUX
in that semester. This includes those whose participation is subsidized as well as
those who do not get any subsidy. There is also information about whether the
course(s) taken were day or evening courses, about the level of education prior
to participation, and about the municipality where the course was taken. For the
years 1997–2000, additional detailed information on adult education experiences
is available, but this information is incomplete and could not be satisfactorily
matched to the KOMVUX register, with one important exception: we observe for
each course taken whether it was completed or whether the participant dropped
out.
73.2 Variable deﬁnitions, sample selections, and data de-
scriptives
We focus on the treatment of being in KOMVUX in the KL years. In particular,
we distinguish between the following treatments: being in KOMVUX in the sec-
ond half of 1997 (97-II) and not before or after, being in KOMVUX in 98-I and
not before or after, and so forth: 98-II, [97-II and 98-I], [98-I and 98-II]. We do
not consider treatments of more than two semesters, because these often involve
diﬀerent remuneration eligibilities. We also do not consider treatments consist-
ing of KOMVUX participation periods that are interrupted by semesters out of
KOMVUX, since such treatments may have fundamentally diﬀerent eﬀects. Also,
we do not consider treatments that end after 98-II because then the time distance
to the (only available) post-treatment year 2000 is too small to detect any long
run eﬀect. Finally, we do not consider treatments where no course is completed by
the end of the semester in which it should have been completed. The individuals
with such treatments are omitted from the data.
We restrict attention to individuals who are between 25 and 55 at the moment
of treatment. This is because individuals below 25 and above 55 face diﬀerent
active labor market programs, educational opportunities, and remuneration eli-
gibilities while unemployed and in education (see e.g. Larsson, 2003). As noted
in Section 1, young individuals who left the regular school system with low ed-
ucational levels may use KOMVUX as a short-cut towards regular university
education (see e.g. Ekstr¨ om, 2003). In such cases, it takes many years after par-
ticipation in KOMVUX before the individual returns to the labor market.
We also restrict attention to low-skilled individuals, i.e. having at most two
years of upper secondary education or an equivalent of that, upon the start of
the treatment. This restriction is consistent with the main KL objective to raise
the skill level of low-skilled workers. For each treatment considered, we exclude
individuals who were in KOMVUX at any time between 1990 and the beginning
of the treatment, or who were in KOMVUX at any time after the treatment up to
the end of the observation window. However, we make an exception to this rule
if the data unambiguously establish that the KOMVUX participation concerned
the attainment of a level lower than or equal to two years of upper secondary
education, as this constitutes a transition within the low-skill category.
The data contain only a few explanatory variables at the individual level.
Most of the analyses are carried out with data stratiﬁed on gender and (at the
same time) on whether one is prime-aged (25–40) or older (41–55), with age
measured at the year of the considered treatment. Even then, the number of
8individuals by gender × age category who are treated in certain semesters is rather
small (see below). We therefore adopt empirical approaches that do not require
many explanatory variables (see the next section). We discard the group of older
men because the number of treated observations is too small for any meaningful
analysis. For the same reason we discard immigrants, except those from Nordic
countries, who are merged with the natives (about 18% of the participants are
immigrants from outside the Nordic region.)
For a given treatment period and age interval and gender, the control group
is deﬁned by the restriction that its individuals satisfy the same criteria as the
treated (so having the same gender, being in the same age interval in the treat-
ment period, having a low skill level, satisfying the KOMVUX participation re-
strictions, and having been born in Sweden or another Nordic country) except
of course that they should not be in KOMVUX during the treatment period.
Note that one individual can be a member of control groups for diﬀerent treat-
ment periods. Members of the treatment and control groups can work during the
treatment periods.
To capture the pre-treatment conditions of individuals, we focus on outcomes
in 1994. This year is suﬃciently far before the treatment periods to rule out an-
ticipatory eﬀects. For the years before 1994 the unemployment insurance data
are less reliable, and for the years before 1993 the employment oﬃce data are rel-
atively unreliable. The year 1996 displays the pre-program earnings (or Ashenfel-
ter) dip. Figure 1 illustrates this concerning being in KOMVUX in 97-II, by way
of a graph of the annual income of individuals between 25 and 40 for the treated
and the controls (in the price level of the year 2000). The ﬁgure also suggests a
post-treatment earnings dip in at least 1998 and (for men) 1999. For the longer
treatment periods, the post-program earnings dip seems to be more pronounced
and prolonged (see e.g. Figure 2 concerning being in KOMVUX in both 97-II and
98-I).2 We therefore primarily use 2000 as the post-treatment evaluation year.
Table 1 shows the eﬀect on the sample size of successive imposition of the
data restrictions discussed above, when we distill the treatment and control group
samples for treatment 97-II using 1994 and 2000 as pre- and post-program years.
For this case we end up with treatment and control groups of 225 and 38,670
individuals, respectively. Subsequent stratiﬁcation into gender × age categories
results in subsamples with treatment groups of around 70 individuals.
For most treatment periods we consider, the average income level in 1994
2For young individuals such a dip may be due to the use of KOMVUX in order to subse-
quently study at regular university education for a number of years. However, recall that in the
data we exclude individuals aged below 25.
9Figure 1: Average annual income for treated and controls aged 25–40, concerning
treatment in 97-II.
Figure 2: Average annual income for treated and controls aged 25–40, concerning
treatment in [97-II and 98-I].
10Table 1: Determination of the ultimate samples for the evaluation of participation
in KOMVUX in 97-II, using 1994 and 2000 as pre- and post-program years.
successive selection criterium resulting sample size
from population aged between 16 and 65 in 1997 200,000
present in this age frame in 1994 and 2000 175,221
aged between 25 and 55 in August 1997 131,352
born in Sweden or other Nordic countries 120,060
low skilled in August 1997 69,414
no KOMVUX before or after 97-II 55,295
of which:
→ in KOMVUX in 97-II 333
no dropout 254
not men aged 41-55 (⇒ treatment groups) 225
→ not in KOMVUX in 97-II 54,962
not men aged 41-55 (⇒ control groups) 38,670
among treated men is lower than the average income level in 1994 among the cor-
responding controls. In most cases the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. However, among
young and older women the diﬀerence is not systematically positive or nega-
tive, and the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant. The same applies to the employment
rates and to average outcomes in 2000. Thus, the productivity levels and em-
ployment probabilities among the treated men are on average lower than in the
corresponding population of low-skilled male individuals. Clearly, therefore, the
treated men are a selective subgroup of this population. For women we do not
ﬁnd such evidence.
The years before 1994 in the annual-income observation window (1990–1993)
concern a period with a major recession in Sweden.3 Note from Figures 1 and 2
that the average income among treated men decreases at the end of this recession
3In 1994 the unemployment rate is still relatively high. Our estimation methods take account
of changes in aggregate conditions.
11and does not recover in the years immediately after that. This also shows up
for the other treatment periods we consider and for the male employment rates.
Apparently, the set of male individuals who enroll in KL in the late 1990s contains
relatively many individuals who suﬀered from the recession in the early 1990s in
the sense that their labor market position is persistently worse afterwards. This
ﬁts in with the “life-long learning” objective of modern adult education programs
to help individuals who are aﬀected by negative shocks. For young women, the
drop in average income at the end of the recession is smaller, and for older women
we do not ﬁnd any evidence of a drop. This again suggests that (older) female
enrollees have a diﬀerent background than the male enrollees.
4 Empirical analysis of average eﬀects on indi-
vidual outcomes, using micro data
4.1 Eﬀects on income
4.1.1 Conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation of average treat-
ment eﬀects on the treated, concerning income
To analyze the eﬀects on annual incomes we apply a version of the “condi-
tional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences” method developed by Heckman et al. (1998)4.
This method estimates the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATET) in a
population, allowing for treatment eﬀect heterogeneity and self-selection on unob-
servables. In order to estimate the average eﬀect, the individuals in the treatment
and control groups should be aligned in terms of observed explanatory variables,
for example by matching them on the propensity score. Subsequently, the average
diﬀerence between the treatment and control groups of the diﬀerences of the out-
comes in the pre- and post-treatment evaluation years equals the ATET. To see
the assumptions involved, it is useful to brieﬂy consider a regression speciﬁcation
for annual income Yi,t of individual i at year t. This is conceptually inferior to a
nonparametric counterfactual framework (see e.g. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith,
1999) but it facilitates the exposition. Let
Yi,t = g(Xi,t)+Vi + δ(Ui,V i,X i)I(Zi,t > 0) + εi,t (1)
4See Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2004) and Blundell et al. (2004) for subse-
quent applications.
12where Xi are observed explanatory variables, g is an unknown function, Ui and
Vi are individual-speciﬁc eﬀects (which may depend on Xi), δ is the treatment
eﬀect function (which may depend on t), Zi,t > 0 indicates that the individual
has participated in KL in the past, and the errors εi,t are zero-mean and in-
dependently identically distributed. Note that we may allow for time-dependent
observed explanatory variables, and we may allow δ to depend on other covariates
than those in g.F o re a c hi,t we observe Yi,t,X i, and I(Zi,t > 0). Participation
in KL is endogenous in the sense that it may be aﬀected by the same individual
characteristics as those aﬀecting Yi,t. Speciﬁcally, Zi,t may be aﬀected by Ui,V i,
and Xi, but it is independent of εi,t. In the regression speciﬁcation, the spurious
dependence between treatment participation and outcome runs by way of Vi and
the spurious dependence between treatment eﬀect and outcome runs by way of
both Ui and Vi.
Let the pre- and post-treatment evaluation years be denoted by t =0a n d
t = 1, respectively. Consider two individuals (i = a,b)w i t ht h es a m eX, but
Zb,1 > 0w h e r e a sZa,1 < 0. From (1) it follows that
(Yb,1 − Yb,0) − (Ya,1 − Ya,0)=δ(Ub,V b,X b)+εb,1 − εb,0 − εa,1 + εa,0
so that, by taking the average over the treated, we obtain the ATET. Clearly,
it is crucial that the income variable is additive in the unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects
Vi. Moreover, these ﬁxed eﬀects should not change over time. The average time
trend eﬀects in income should be the same for individuals in the treatment and
control groups who have identical covariates.
In our version of conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation, the analysis
is stratiﬁed on all observed explanatory variables. In a given analysis, the treated
and controls are then homogeneous in terms of observed explanatory variables
(but not in terms of unobserved explanatory variables). This means that the
ATET simply equals the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences of the means of Y calculated
for the treated and controls for the pre- and post-treatment year.
Conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences has a number of advantages. First, it al-
lows for eﬀect heterogeneity. Secondly, it can handle Ashenfelter’s Dip in a nat-
ural way. Thirdly, it handles various types of selection eﬀects. This includes self-
selection into the treatment on the basis of the expected individual outcomes and
costs, and selection of the moment of enrollment and the duration of participation.
Fourthly, it does not require exclusion restrictions (like in natural experiments)
to identify the treatment eﬀect. Such a restriction requires that the data contain
a variable that aﬀects the treatment assignment but that does not aﬀect the out-
13come of interest other than by way of the treatment. This is often diﬃcult to
justify. If a variable is observed by the analyst then it is often also observable
to the individuals under consideration. If the variable aﬀects the probability of
treatment, and the individual knows that he may be subject to treatment, then
he takes his value of the variable into account to determine his optimal strat-
egy, and this strategy in turn aﬀects the rate at which the individual leaves the
state of interest. Our data certainly do not contain any candidate instrumental
variables.
Our approach to stratify the treatment and control groups by age and gender
is motivated by the lack of observed explanatory variables. However, it also has
some speciﬁc advantages over the use of propensity score matching. First, the
results do not depend on a functional form for the propensity score as a function
of the matching variables. Secondly, we do not need to rely on asymptotic theory
or bootstrapping in order to estimate standard errors. Instead, we may calculate
the exact small-sample standard errors of the estimated eﬀects.
The assumption that the average time trend eﬀect in income does not depend
on the treatment status of individuals with identical covariates may be violated in
practice. On average, non-treated individuals gather more work experience than
treated individuals between the pre- and post-program year, for three reasons.
First of all, they have more time to work during the treatment period. Secondly,
they are less often unemployed shortly before the treatment period. Thirdly, many
of them work at the end of the treatment period so they do not need to spend
time to ﬁnd a job then. With positive returns to work experience, their long-run
average income level may exceed that of initially identical individuals who were
treated, even if the treatment itself does not have any causal eﬀect at all. In the
presence of a positive treatment eﬀect, this would lead to an under-estimate of
this eﬀect. This is a common but ignored problem in applications of (conditional)
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences.
4.1.2 Estimation results
Table 2 presents the conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates of the average
treatment eﬀect on the treated concerning participation in KOMVUX in 97-II,
using 1994 and 2000 as pre- and post-program years. Clearly, the ATET estimates
are all insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (note that the estimates for the young
groups are in accordance to Figure 1). Concerning the magnitude of the estimates
it should be recalled that young men on average have higher wages than women,
and that the outcome variable of interest is the level rather than the logarithm
of income.
14Table 2: Estimates of the average treatment eﬀects on the treated, concerning
participation in KOMVUX in 97-II, using 1994 and 2000 as pre- and post-program
years and annual income as outcome measure (in 1000 SEK in the year 2000).
type of individual ATET (standard error) ntreated ncontrol
Male, aged 25–40 10.5 (13) 69 15061
Female, aged 25–40 0.6 (10) 96 9163
Female, aged 41–55 -3.6 (13) 60 14446
We also ﬁnd insigniﬁcant ATET estimates for other treatments with a dura-
tion of one semester. Note that for those cases the time between the treatment
and the post-program year is at most only 1.5 years. From the previous section,
comparing incomes in 2000 for such cases is hampered by the post-treatment
earnings dip.
For the treatments with a duration of 1 or 1.5 years, the above conclusions
are reinforced. The results are also insensitive as to whether medium-skilled in-
dividuals are included among the treated. We repeated the analysis using log
income instead of the income level as outcome variable, but this did not aﬀect
the conclusions.
We also perform analyses with trimmed income data. This serves to exclude
any disturbance eﬀects of measurement errors in the data. Moreover, very low
incomes including zero incomes do not reﬂect the individual monetary means
available for survival; presumably such individuals rely on family members’ in-
come. We use a lower income bound of SEK 50k per year for every year, and
an upper bound equal to SEK 160k in 1994, linearly increasing with SEK 10k
per year, up to SEK 220k in 2000 (all these numbers are in terms of the 2000
price level). These bounds are applied to the treated as well as the corresponding
controls. We may therefore also consider the trimming as a crude device to match
treated and controls on the pre-treatment annual income.
Table 6 in Appendix 1 gives the ATET estimates for the individuals whose
incomes in the pre- and post-treatment years are within the above range. Again,
all estimates are insigniﬁcant. In comparison to the estimates in Table 2, the
eﬀects are somewhat larger for women and smaller for young men. This suggests
15that men without income (and men with very low incomes) beneﬁt more from
KL than men with better labor market conditions. For women the reverse holds.
We also examine the eﬀects on the median of the income distribution. For
each gender, age, year, and treatment semester(s), one may replicate the ATET
estimation with median incomes instead of average incomes. The main advantage
is that this is insensitive to the handling of zero incomes and income outliers. The
main disadvantage is that the resulting estimate cannot be related to a meaningful
eﬀect at the individual level, basically because the diﬀerence of the median does
not equal the median of the diﬀerence. The estimates on the eﬀect on the median
somewhat exceed those in Table 2.
The results suggest that KL does not increase annual income. Alternatively,
the sample sizes of treated individuals may simply be too small for a meaningful
analysis. There is some evidence that disadvantaged young men beneﬁt from KL
in terms of annual income.
4.1.3 Meta analysis
So far we performed separate analyses for diﬀerent treatment periods and for
diﬀerent gender × age types. However, the time dependence of the average income
of the various treatment and control groups satisﬁes certain regularities (recall
the ﬁgures in the previous section). We may exploit this to enhance the eﬃciency
of the analysis. After all, the insigniﬁcance of the non-parametric estimates might
be due to the small sample sizes for given treatment periods. In addition, recall
that treatments in periods that end close to the latest year available in the data
are hard to evaluate, but if the pre-treatment-period income patterns are similar
to those for other treatment periods then we can still use the corresponding data
to enhance the eﬃciency.
In this subsection we therefore analyze the treatment eﬀects by gender × age
type and treatment period in a uniﬁed framework. We postulate a parametric
non-linear regression model for the observed average annual income Y per gender
× age type, per year, per treatment period, and per treatment status, where
the average is taken over the individuals in the speciﬁc group we consider. This
model is supposed to capture the average income patterns over time for the
various treatment and control groups. It therefore also captures the ATETs that
we estimated non-parametrically in the previous subsection.
We now let the index i denote the gender × age type instead of the individual,
and we again use t to denote a given year, the value t = 1 corresponding to the
year 1991 and the value t = 10 to 2000. We distinguish the various treatment
periods by way of variables a and τ. Here, a denotes the length of the treatment
16period (a =0a n da = 1 corresponding to lengths 0.5 and 1, respectively) and τ
denotes the center of the period, as measured by the calendar year in which the
income dip is deepest (1998, except for the treatment period 97-II). Finally, we
use D to denote the treatment status of the group considered. This is a binary
variable taking the value 1 if the individuals in the group will be treated in one
of the treatment periods. We now postulate
Yi,t,a,τ,D = c0,i + c1,it + c2,iD +( 2 )










Consider ﬁrst the control groups, i.e. with D = 0. The parameters c0,i,c 1,i
describe for each i separately a linear equation for Y as a function of t. Subse-
quently, the parameters c2,i give the long-run pre-treatment diﬀerence between
treatment and control groups, for each i.T h ev a l u e so fc2,i reﬂect to what extent
the treated are a special subgroup of the individuals with a given i.N o t et h a t
we assume that these parameters do not depend on the length or starting date
of the treatment period.
The parameters c3,c 4 and c5 capture the pre- and post-program dip. If c5
is large then the dip is wide. The functional form of the shape of the dip as a
function of t−τ and a reﬂects the shape observed in the data. For example, if the
treatment period is long then the dip is deeper. The shape of the dip is imposed
to be symmetric, and is also assumed to be identical across i.
Finally, the parameters c6,i capture the ATETs. The corresponding term in
square brackets reﬂects that the ATET is only revealed after the post-treatment
dip. This term increases in t,f r o m0a tt = τ to 0.31 at t = τ +1 ,a n ds oo n ,
quickly converging to 1. For sake of brevity we do not make the ATETs dependent
on the length or starting date of the treatment period.
Note that a and τ and the associated parameters c3,c 4,c 5,c 6,i are only relevant
if D = 1. In general, the parameters of the equation should not be given a
causal or structural interpretation. They merely capture how Y varies with its
determinants. The only exception are the c6,i parameters, which are supposed to
capture the ATETs.
We estimate the equation with the data on Y for each combination of 3 values
of i,1 0v a l u e so ft (1991–2000), 5 diﬀerent treatment periods, and 2 diﬀerent
treatment statuses. In fact we only use data from one control group for each value
of i and t, because the diﬀerent control groups contain mostly the same individuals
17(accordingly, the data on Y are virtually the same across these groups). We take
the control group corresponding to the treatment period 98-I. As a result, we
have 3 × 10 × (5 + 1) = 180 observations for the regression.
For older women, the data show that the linear speciﬁcation of Y as a function
of t in the control group is incorrect because Y ﬂattens out as time proceeds. We
therefore replace it by an increasing concave function. Speciﬁcally, we replace c1,it
in equation (2) for older women by
c1 · log(t + c7)
Note that this makes the c0 and c1 parameters uncomparable between young men
and women on the one hand and older women on the other.
We estimate the model with Nonlinear Least Squares. The regression analy-
sis ignores a few statistical complications. First, for a given gender, age interval,
treatment period, and treatment status, the average incomes in diﬀerent years
mostly concern the same individuals. At the individual level, incomes in consecu-
tive years are typically correlated, leading to dependency of the error terms in the
average income regression. Secondly, the standard error of the estimated average
income depends on the sample size in the year considered and therefore varies
across years, leading to heteroskedasticity.
Table 3 presents the estimation results. The main result concerns the insignif-
icance of the ATETs for all age and gender types. This reinforces the results
of the previous subsection. Other notable results are that young male enrollees
are a selective subset of the corresponding population, whereas this is not true
for young and older women. The pre- and post-program dip is deeper for longer
treatments. The average annual population income increase is larger for young
men than for young women, and this is in turn larger than for older women.
The results are very robust. Notably, the insigniﬁcance of the ATETs is robust
with respect to changes in the functional form of the dip and the time-dependence
of the extent to which the ATET reveals itself. Also, if we restrict attention to
the calendar years 1994–2000 then we obtain virtually the same results.
Diﬀerences in annual income are an imperfect indicator of productivity diﬀer-
ences, because they also reﬂect diﬀerences in the employment rate. In the next
subsection we directly estimate the employment eﬀects of KL.
18Table 3: Estimates of the non-linear regression model for average annual income
as a function of gender, age, calendar time, treatment period, and treatment
status (in 1000 SEK in the year 2000).
parameter estimate (standard error)
constant term c0
all 36.6∗ (11)
additional for male, aged 25–40 73.8∗ (12)
additional for female, aged 25–40 25.2∗ (12)
time trend
c1 male, aged 25–40: 8.8∗ (0.6)
c1 female, aged 25–40: 7.5∗ (0.6)
c1 female, aged 41–55: 43.1∗ (4.3)
c7 female, aged 41–55: 2.16∗ (0.4)
pre-program diﬀerence of treated c2
Male, aged 25–40 -27.7∗ (3.3)
Female, aged 25–40 -4.3 (3.3)
Female, aged 41–55 0.0 (3.3)
Ashenfelter dip
c3 long treatment period -50.1∗ (4.0)
c4 short treatment period -19.8∗ (3.5)
c5 width of the dip 0.63∗ (0.1)
treatment eﬀect c6
Male, aged 25–40 -6.0 (10)
Female, aged 25–40 -14.6 (10)
Female, aged 41–55 -1.4 (10)
R-squared 0.91
#o b s e r v a t i o n s 180
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
194.2 Eﬀects on the employment rate
4.2.1 Conditional probit analyses of treatment eﬀects on the employ-
ment rate
We distinguish between two labor market states: employment and unemploy-
ment. We are interested in the eﬀect of the treatment on the probability of being
employed. The model framework and estimation strategy are similar in spirit to
those in the previous subsection. The main diﬀerence concerns the fact that now
the outcome measure E is binary. This makes it less attractive to adopt a linear
model for the outcomes, like for example the linear model for Y in equation (1).
We therefore specify a latent variable model and a corresponding analog of the
conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation method.
Let the (latent) variable E∗
i,t satisfy, in obvious notation,
E
∗
i,t = g(Xi,t)+Vi + δ(Xi)I(Zi,t > 0) + εi,t (3)
The main restriction, as compared to the income eﬀects analyses, is that the
treatment eﬀect is now constant for given Xi. That is, the treatment eﬀect het-
erogeneity is reduced to heterogeneity across age and gender. This is the price
to be paid for adopting a latent variable framework of analysis. For each i,t we
observe Ei,t := I(E∗
i,t > 0) as well as Xi and I(Zi,t > 0). Participation in KL is
endogenous in the sense that Zi,t may be aﬀected by Vi and Xi.N o t et h a tn o w
the probability of employment is a non-linear function of the treatment status
and the other determinants.
As in the previous subsection, we stratify the empirical analysis on all ob-
served explanatory variables Xi. In a given analysis, the treated and controls are
therefore homogeneous in terms of observed explanatory variables (but not in
terms of unobserved explanatory variables). We may therefore simplify equation
(3) to E∗
i,t = g(t)+Vi + δI(Zi,t > 0) + εi,t.
The well known conditional logit estimation method can be used to estimate
the δ parameter, in the following way. First, assume that the above outcome
equation for given t deﬁnes a logit model. Secondly, let t =0 ,1, and consider the
conditional probability of making a transition from Ei,0 =0t oEi,1 = 1 (or from
Ei,0 =1t oEi,1 =0 )given that the individual labor market states at t =0a n d
t = 1 are diﬀerent. This deﬁnes a new binary outcome. We deﬁne a corresponding
binary variable Hi as follows: Hi =1i fEi,0 =0a n dEi,1 =1 ,a n dHi =0i f
Ei,0 =1a n dEi,1 = 0. In all other cases Hi is undeﬁned. In words, Hi =1i ft h e
individual makes a transition from unemployment to employment and Hi =0i f
20the transition is the other way round, whereas individuals who are in the same
state are removed. Note that what matters is not what exactly occurs between the
years corresponding to t =0a n dt = 1, but whether, and if so how, the individual
labor market states diﬀer between these years. The variable Hi also follows a logit
model speciﬁcation, with the treatment status as the only explanatory variable.
So we can introduce a latent variable H∗
i satisfying H∗
i = β0 + δI(Zi,1 > 0) +  i.
This allows for straightforward estimation of δ.
Note that this estimation method is similar to the conditional diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences method. Examining Hi instead of Ei,t means examining a sort of ﬁrst
diﬀerence across time for a given individual. It removes the ﬁxed eﬀect Vi from
the analysis. The average of Hi in the control group provides an estimate of the
time trend (β0) in the employment outcomes. The average of Hi in the treatment
groups subsequently identiﬁes the treatment eﬀect. In fact, we assume that Hi
follows a probit model speciﬁcation. This assumes a diﬀerent class of distributions
for εi,t (see Magnac, 2001) but is otherwise equivalent to conditional logit.
A disadvantage of conditional logit and conditional probit is that they do not
enable the estimation of the quantitative eﬀect of treatment on the employment
outcomes Ei,t. This eﬀect is non-linear and depends on the unknown ﬁxed eﬀects
Vi. This means that we can only make a qualitative evaluation, in the sense that
we can only determine the sign and signiﬁcance of the treatment eﬀect.
In the empirical analysis we divide the pre- and post-treatment year into three
periods each: January-April, May-August, and September-December. We deﬁne
an individual to be employed in a given period if he is employed for more than half
of the period (otherwise we call him unemployed in the period). However, we do
not directly observe the employment spells within a period. The fraction of time
spent in employment has to be induced from the observations of the moments of
the transitions into and out of unemployment and the corresponding origin and
destination states, notably employment, and from the income data. It cannot be
ruled out that a period between successive transitions in and out of employment
also includes spells of non-participation.
We compare the employment outcome in a given period in the pre-treatment
year to the outcome in the corresponding period in the post-treatment year. This
eﬀectively multiplies the sample size by three (although only observations where
the pre- and post-treatment year outcomes diﬀer contribute to the empirical re-
sults). The three observations for a given individual may be dependent to the
extent that their joint determinants are not captured by the common ﬁxed eﬀect.
We conjecture that such a dependence would lead to an under-estimation of a
positive employment eﬀect, because if individuals make relatively many transi-
21tions within a given year, then a transition from unemployment to employment
for given periods of the year is often succeeded by a transition from employment
to unemployment for the subsequent periods.
4.2.2 Estimation results
Table 4 gives the results of the conditional probit analyses. “Fraction U → E
among treated = 0.74” means that among the treated who have a diﬀerent indi-
vidual labor market status in 1994 than in 2000, 74% were unemployed in 1994
and employed in 2000, and 26% were employed in 1994 and unemployed in 2000.
For women aged below 40, the fraction of transitions from unemployment to em-
ployment is higher among the treated than among the controls, and this shows
up in the estimate of δ being positive.5
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive employment eﬀect for young men. For young
women the eﬀect is positive but insigniﬁcant. For older women the eﬀect is nega-
tive but very insigniﬁcant. Somewhat loosely, the result for young men is driven
by the relatively high frequency of young men who are unemployed in 1994, follow
KOMVUX in 97-II, and are employed in 2000.
We end this section by summarizing the conclusions of the analyses with micro
data. First, KL has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on average income and employment of
women. Among young and older women, enrollees are similar to non-enrollees in
terms of average pre-program labor market outcomes, and KL does not improve
the average outcomes of the enrollees. If anything, young women beneﬁt slightly
from KL, whereas KL participation of older women goes along with a slight
deterioration of outcomes.
For young men the results are diﬀerent. The enrollees are on average more
disadvantaged in terms of pre-program labor market outcomes than the non-
enrollees. In particular, they include relatively many who have been hit by the
early-1990s recession. On average, KL participation signiﬁcantly increases the
probability of employment among young men. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on average annual income, although the magnitude of the corresponding average
treatment eﬀect on the treated is much larger than for young and older women.
At ﬁrst sight, this absence of a signiﬁcant average income eﬀect suggests that
KL has not had positive productivity eﬀects. This would be at odds with the
objective of KL to improve the skill level. A ﬁrst explanation for the absence
of an income eﬀect in conjunction with the occurrence of an employment eﬀect
5In a linear probability model, the estimated employment eﬀect simply equals the diﬀerence
of 0.74 and 0.68.
22Table 4: Estimates of the treatment eﬀect on the employment probability, con-
cerning participation in KOMVUX in 97-II, using 1994 and 2000 as pre- and
post-program years.
type of individual: female, female, male,
aged 25–40 aged 41–55 aged 25–40
fraction U → E among treated 0.74 0.39 0.90
(0.045) (0.068) (0.037)
number of transitions among treated 94 51 63
fraction U → E among controls 0.68 0.42 0.74
(0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0044)
number of transitions among controls 5347 6285 9977
probit estimate of β0 0.47 -0.21 0.64
(0.018) (0.016) (0.013)
probit estimate of δ 0.19 -0.064 0.67
(0.14) (0.18) (0.22)
is that the sample size on incomes among the treated is simply too small. A
second explanation is that the only eﬀective component of KL is the increased
exposure to the labor market due to a strong involvement of the case worker who
may bring the enrollee in contact with suitable vacancies. KL would then work
as a job search assistance program (see Richardson and Van den Berg, 2001, for
evidence that another Swedish training program works this way). However, if this
is correct then one would also expect an employment eﬀect for female enrollees.
Moreover, one would expect a strong employment eﬀect very quickly after leaving
the program.
A third explanation is that in Sweden, wages in the labor market do not
reﬂect productivity, because of strong wage compression. In particular, the wage-
enhancing eﬀect of productivity increases due to KL for previously low-skilled
workers may be constrained by Swedish labor market institutions governing wage
23setting. However, this is hard to reconcile with the observed cross-sectional wage
dispersion and the observed variation in individual wage changes over time. Also,
with this explanation one would still expect an employment eﬀect for female
enrollees.
A fourth explanation is that the conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences evalua-
tion method may under-estimate the average KL income eﬀect, because of the
gain in work experience in the control groups. To gauge some feeling for the
magnitude of the bias, suppose that, in 2000, the young male individuals in the
control groups have on average accumulated one additional year of regular work
experience. According to Table 3, this corresponds to a gain of about SEK 8.8k in
annual income in 2000. If we add this to the ATET estimate of 10.5 for young men
taken from Table 2, then we obtain a corrected ATET estimate of 19.3 (standard
error 13) in annual income (for women the corrected estimates are still close to
zero). Any under-estimation of income eﬀects is exacerbated if the post-program
year used in the evaluation is still in the post-program dip. In that case the time-
frame of the data does not allow for the full eﬀects of the program to come to
the limelight.
A ﬁfth explanation is that there may be equilibrium eﬀects that aﬀect the
average income eﬀects. After all, the program is so large that a substantial fraction
of the low-skilled workers without work participate in it. One may expect eﬀects
on the behavior and outcomes of employers and labor market participants who
have not been enrolled in KL. This in turn may aﬀect the outcomes of the enrollees
as well. To investigate this, we perform an equilibrium analysis in the next section.
5 Analysis of equilibrium eﬀects
5.1 The model
As indicated in the introduction, we use the equilibrium labor market model from
Albrecht and Vroman (2002). We ﬁrst present a generalization of that model.
Then we calibrate it and we simulate the potential equilibrium eﬀects of the
program.
The model is a stylized one in which risk-neutral workers live forever. The
measure of workers is normalized to 1. The skill distribution is taken as exogenous




Jobs are described by their minimum skill requirement, y. The technology is
such that the output produced by a job of type y with a worker of skill s is
24x(s,y)=
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y if s  y
0i fs<y
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A job is either vacant or ﬁlled. When a job of type y is ﬁlled by a worker of
skill s, a wage of w(s,y) is paid and a cost of cy is incurred. That is, the ﬂow value
to the ﬁrm of ﬁlling a job of type y with a worker of skill s is y − w(s,y) − cy,
conditional, of course, on s  y. The corresponding ﬂow value to the worker
holding the job is the wage. When a job is vacant, the ﬁxed cost must still be
paid so the ﬂow value of a vacancy of type y is −cy. The corresponding ﬂow
value to an unemployed worker is b, which can be interpreted as unemployment
compensation and/or the value of not working.
Matches break up (ﬁlled jobs become vacant) at the rate δy, i.e., we assume
that job stability varies by job type (this, as well as the dependence of c on y,
generalizes Albrecht and Vroman, 2002).6 The ﬂow in the opposite direction is
governed by a matching function. Speciﬁcally, unemployed workers and vacancies
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We use the following notation:
U(s) is the value of unemployment for a worker of skill s
N(s,y) is the value of employment for a worker of skill s on a job of type y
V (y) is the value of a vacancy of type y,
J(s,y) is the value to an employer of ﬁlling a job of type y with a worker
of skill s.
A match will be formed if and only if
N(s,y)+J(s,y)  U(s)+V (y)
and when a match is formed, the wage, w(s,y), is given by the Nash bargaining
condition,
N(s,y) − U(s)=β[N(s,y)+J(s,y) − U(s) − V (y)],
where β is the exogenously given worker’s share of the surplus.
We assume free entry and exit of vacancies, so in equilibrium, there will be at
most S skill requirements: yj = sj,j=1 ,...,S. We deﬁne φj to be the fraction of
vacancies requiring skill sj and γi to be the fraction of the unemployed who have
6Note that δ has a diﬀerent meaning than in Section 4.
25skill si. The unemployment rate, u, labor market tightness, θ, and the fractions
{φj}S
j=1 and {γi}S
i=1 are the fundamental endogenous variables of the model.
The value functions for ﬁlled jobs are
rN(si,s j)=w(si,s j)+δj[U(si) − N(si,s j)]
rJ(si,s j)=sj − w(si,s j) − cj + δj[V (sj) − J(si,s j)]
Both of these are conditional on si ≥ sj. The value of unemployment for a worker




φj max[N(si,s j) − U(si),0]






γi max[J(si,s j) − V (sj),0]
Free entry and exit of vacancies implies V (sj) ≤ 0, with equality if φj > 0,
j =1 ,...,S.
The above expressions imply that a match will be formed if and only if
sj − cj  rU(si)
and the wage of a worker of skill si on a job requiring skill sj is
w(si,s j)=β(sj − cj)+( 1− β)rU(si).
Both of these are conditional on si ≥ sj.
We look for steady-state equilibria. A steady-state equilibrium is a collection
of variables u,θ , {φj}S
j=1, and {γi}S
i=1 such that (i) the appropriate steady-state
conditions hold, (ii) there is free entry and exit of vacancies, i.e., V (sj) ≤ 0( =0
if φj > 0), and (iii) matches form iﬀ sj − cj ≥ rU(si). Several equilibrium types
are possible. For example, one might consider an equilibrium in which workers at
each skill level match only with vacancies requiring precisely that skill, i.e., an
equilibrium with perfect assortative matching. We refer to this case as equilibrium
with ex post segmentation. At the other extreme, an equilibrium might entail all
possible matches; i.e., a worker of skill si could match with any job of type sj ≤ si.
We refer to this case as equilibrium with full cross-skill matching. Intermediate
cases, in which some but not all possible matches are formed, are also possible.
26The nature of equilibrium depends on the exogenous parameters of the model.
If an equilibrium of a particular type exists, e.g., an equilibrium with ex post seg-
mentation, then that equilibrium is unique within that class. There may, however,
be multiple equilibria in the sense that equilibria of more than one type can exist
simultaneously.
We model KL as a change in the proportions of the labor force in the various
skill categories, moving low-skill workers to the medium skill level. Before KL,
the labor force has a certain skill distribution and the market is in a certain
equilibrium. We use pre-KL data to calibrate this equilibrium. After KL, the
labor force has another skill distribution, with more medium-skill workers and
less low-skill workers. We simulate the new labor market equilibrium on the basis
of the new skill distribution as well as the structural parameters obtained in
the calibration. Comparison of the equilibrium outcomes is informative on the
equilibrium eﬀects of KL for various worker types. We are particularly interested
in the changes in outcomes for individuals who were previously low skilled and
currently medium skilled.
A theoretical analysis of the transition path between the equilibria is unfeasi-
ble. Also, a comparative statics exercise that compares two equilibria can not be
translated into a sequence of actions and reactions by individual agents. However,
from the above equations we can get some idea about the underlying mechanisms.
With more medium-skilled workers, the rate at which employers contact them
increases. Similarly, the rate at which low-skill workers are contacted decreases.
This provides an incentive for employers to create medium-skill jobs rather than
low-skill jobs. Labor demand thus adjusts to labor supply. The extent to which
this occurs depends on the parameters of the model and on the assumed speci-
ﬁcation of the production function. Simultaneously, the labor market tightness,
the transition rates from unemployment to employment by worker-skill level, the
unemployment rate, and the wage rates by worker/job-skill combination change.
Again the results depend on the model parameters and functions.
It is important to point out that we do not assume that KL has a direct eﬀect
on the individual contact rate for a given skill level in a given equilibrium. So in
this sense there is no causal “job search assistance” eﬀect on the transition rates
to work. However, individuals who are treated in KL qualify for a diﬀerent set
of jobs in the new equilibrium. In addition, since KL aﬀects the proportions of
low-skill workers and low-skill jobs, there is an indirect eﬀect on the transition
rates to work even for individuals who do not change skill level.
275.2 Application to the Knowledge Lift
5.2.1 Data for the calibration
The data we use are for 1996, the year before the start of the KL, and are taken
from publications from Statistics Sweden. Notably, we use data from AKU, which
is the Swedish labor force survey, and from the L¨ onestatistisk ˚ Arsbok, which gives
wage data aggregated from ﬁrm records (see Statistics Sweden, 1997a, 1997b).
For our calibration, we use the crudest possible set of skill levels, namely, low-
skill (s1) and medium-skill (s2). We assume exogenous skill fractions, identifying
skill with educational attainment. We take those with less education than a 3-
year gymnasium degree, i.e., SUN Codes 1, 2 and 3, to be low-skill and those
with a 3-year gymnasium degree (SUN Code 4) and those with less than 3 years
of post-gymnasium education (SUN Code 5) to be medium-skill7.A K UT a b l e4 3
provides observations of the fractions of labor force participants aged 25-64 by
SUN Codes, and these imply
p1 = .648 p2 = .352
Next, AKU Table 48 gives unemployment by skill level,
Unemployment
SUN Codes 1 2 3 4 5 Total
LF in 100’s 4320 4544 12346 5870 5649 32729
U in 100’s 398 431 996 448 249 2522
Ur a t e s .092 .095 .081 .076 .044 .077
The γ 
is can be computed from these ﬁgures. For example, the fraction of unem-
ployment accounted for by low-skill workers is γ1 = 398+431+996
2522 =0 .724. We thus
have
γ1 = .724 γ2 = .276
Moreover, the average skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates are u1 =0 .086 and
u2 =0 .060.
7SUN stands for Swedish Education Level. There are 7 SUN codes. Category 6 is 3 or more
years of post-gymnasium eduction and category 7 is doctoral education. We assume that there
is no interaction between the labor markets for workers in these higher skill levels and those
that we are calling medium skill. We attempted to calibrate a three-skill level model extension,
but it appeared that the data are inconsistent with such a model.
28We also quantify the exit rates out of unemployment for the two skill groups.
For this we use AKU Table 49, giving the elapsed unemployment duration dis-
tribution by skill. Our model assumes exponential duration distributions. The
exponentiality assumption helps us in two ways. We have data on elapsed, as
opposed to completed, durations. The exponential assumption implies that these
two distributions, i.e., of elapsed and completed durations, are the same. Second,
if ξ is the median of an exp{λ} distribution, then λ = ln2
ξ , i.e., we can use the
median of the elapsed duration distribution to estimate the exponential param-
eter. As a result, the exit rates out of unemployment for low and medium skills
equal 1.899 and 2.163, respectively, in per-year terms.
With an eye on the “Totalt” column of Table 4 of L¨ onestatistisk ˚ Arsbok, we
quantify the wages as w11 = 177,600,w 21 = 186,000,w 22 = 210,000, where wij
is a shorthand for w(si,s j).
5.2.2 Relation to the microeconometric analyses
It is useful to address some major similarities and diﬀerences between the data
used in this section and those used in the previous section.
First, the micro data do not provide wage rates but annual income. Moreover,
the micro data only allow for an imperfect distinction between full-time and
part-time jobs and for a distinction between consecutive spells of employment
and non-participation. This makes it diﬃcult to use the micro data to calibrate
the equilibrium model, which is why we resort to the wage statistics for the latter.
The other aggregate data used in the calibration are taken to be as consistent as
possible with each other and with the wage data.
Secondly, equilibrium models with frictions cannot incorporate the amount
of heterogeneity observed in the micro data, without becoming intractable. This
applies to ex ante heterogeneity in individuals as well as to ex post heterogeneity
in individual outcomes. This is why the present section only distinguishes between
a small number of skill types and why the equilibrium only has a few number of
possible wage outcomes. The equilibrium model does not incorporate unobserved
(to us) heterogeneity and accordingly does not capture selective enrollment into
KL.
Related to this, we feel that in the present section it does not make sense to
perform separate analyses for diﬀerent age or gender categories. The heterogene-
ity in average outcomes between categories is of a much smaller order than the
heterogeneity in outcomes within categories.
We should also recall that the microeconometric analysis includes individuals
who are treated in KL but do not accordingly raise their skill level from low to
29medium, for example because the courses they take do not provide marketable
skills or the courses lead to an improvement of the skill level that is insuﬃcient to
reach the medium skill level. This means that our micro-econometric evaluation
may under-estimate the average eﬀect of an upgrading to the medium skill level.
Next, we use data from 1996 to calibrate the pre-KL equilibrium, whereas in
the microeconometric analysis we use 1994 as the pre-program year. The latter
is warranted because of the pre-program dip among those who are treated in
KL. However, the aggregate data from 1996 that are used in the calibration
consist mostly of individuals who either are never treated in KL or are not treated
immediately after 1996. Using aggregate data from earlier pre-KL years can not
be expected to improve the calibration.
Finally, since we are interested in equilibrium outcomes, and since evidently
the labor market in 2000 was not in the post-KL equilibrium, we cannot use
data from our latest year in the micro datasets in order to calibrate the new
equilibrium.
5.2.3 The calibration of the pre-KL equilibrium
Since we are considering a model with 2 skill levels, there are 2 possible equilib-
rium conﬁgurations, namely
(i). Cross-skill matching: In this equilibrium, medium-skill workers match with
both medium-skill and low-skill vacancies.
(ii). Ex-post segmentation: In this equilibrium, medium-skill workers match only
with medium-skill vacancies.
The large amount of variation in the wage data for medium-skilled workers
ﬁts in better with the ﬁrst conﬁguration. Indeed, in Appendix 2 we demonstrate
that calibration of the second conﬁguration provides non-sensical results. Thus,
we base our analysis on the cross-skill matching equilibrium.
The ﬁrst step in the calibration is to use the steady-state conditions to iden-
tify the ﬂow parameters, namely, δ1,δ 2,φ 1,φ 2, and m(θ). The ﬁrst steady-state
condition is that the ﬂow of low-skill workers into low-skill employment equals
the ﬂow of low-skill workers back into unemployment. This can be expressed as
φ1m(θ)γ1u = δ1e11
where e11 is the fraction of the labor force accounted for by employment of low-
skill workers in low-skill jobs. Given our estimated exit rates and data on unem-
ployment by skill level, we know the value of the left-hand side of this equation.
30Further, since e11 = p1−γ1u, we can compute the remaining unknown in this ﬁrst
steady-state equation, namely, δ1. The second steady-state condition is that the
ﬂow of medium-skill workers into low-skill employment equals the corresponding
ﬂow from low-skill employment back into unemployment,
φ1m(θ)γ2u = δ1e21
This condition gives us e21, the fraction of the labor force accounted for by
medium-skill workers employed in low-skill jobs. Next, the ﬂow of medium-skill
workers into medium-skill employment equals the corresponding ﬂow from medium-
skill employment back into unemployment. That is,
φ2m(θ)γ2u = δ2e22
We know e21+e22, i.e., total employment of medium-skill workers. Either e21 =0 ,
i.e., no medium-skill workers take low-skill jobs, or we know e21 from the second
steady-state condition, so we know e22. The third steady-state condition thus
gives us δ2.
Finally, we know that φ1 + φ2 =1 . Since we know the exit rates from un-
employment for each skill group, we can recover m(θ),φ 1, and φ2. It may be
possible at this point to use the requirement that each φi ∈ [0,1] to rule out some
equilibrium possibilities.
In the second step, we set values for b and r. Given the three wage equations
w(si,s j)=β(sj − cj)+( 1− β)rU(si)f o rsi ≥ sj
and the expression for rU(s1), we can solve for s1 − c1,s 2 − c2,r U (s1),r U (s2),
and β in a cross-skill matching equilibrium.
At this point, we need to check that the relevant conditions on these values
for the particular equilibrium type hold,
s1 − c1 ≥ rU(s2)
s1 − c1 ≥ rU(s1)
s2 − c2 ≥ rU(s2).
If these are not satisﬁed then the parameters of the model are inconsistent with
this type of equilibrium.
The third step of our calibration strategy is to use the zero-value conditions
to recover the cost parameters and the parameters of the matching function.
At this point, we need to ﬁx two more parameters. We assume a Cobb-Douglas
matching function, so m(θ)=Aθα, and we choose plausible values for A and
31α. We choose α =0 .5, with reference to estimates from the empirical literature
on matching functions (e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). The choice of A is
more arbitrary, but since we have already recovered m(θ) from the ﬁrst step of
our procedure, a choice of A is equivalent to choosing θ. Since the numerator of
θ (i.e., the measure of vacancies) is diﬃcult to quantify, this can be viewed as a
normalization. We take A =5 .
Finally, the zero-value conditions for the relevant equilibrium type give us c1
and c2. We would naturally like c1 <c 2 and s1 <s 2. We assume that b = 80000
and r =0 .05.
We now give the results. The exit rates from unemployment are
m(θ)φ1 =1 .899
m(θ)(φ1 + φ2)=m(θ)=2 .163
These imply
m(θ)=2 .163 φ1 =0 .878 φ2 =0 .122
Putting these values into the steady-state conditions allows us to recover the job-
speciﬁc exit rates and the skill composition of employment as described above.
These are
δ1 δ2 e11 e21 e22
.179 .053 .592 .225 .106
Subsequently, from step 2,
s1 − c1 s2 − c2 rU(s1) rU(s2) β
190670 244530 167100 182250 .44557
Note that the inequalities required for cross-skill matching are satisﬁed.
Finally, we solve for θ, c1,c 2,s 1, and s2. Given m(θ)=2 .163, our choice of
α and A implies θ =0 .187 and
m(θ)
θ
=1 1 .56. We recover the cost parameters
from the zero-value conditions. This gives
θ c1 c2 s1 s2
.187 542650 1069400 733320 1313930
This solution ranks the cost and productivity parameters in the desired order.
The results can be used to assess the eﬀects of upgrading the skill level of a
single low-skill individual to the medium skill level. In a market with a continuum
32of workers the upgrading has no measurable eﬀects on the other agents, and we
restrict attention to the eﬀects on outcomes for the individual under consider-
ation. We may call these the “partial” eﬀects of a skill-raising program. They
do not have an empirical counterpart, but as we shall see they are helpful to
understand the equilibrium eﬀects.
For such an individual, the average wage changes from w11 to the mean wage




j e2j), which is an increase of 16086.
The average unemployment rate changes from u1 to u2, i.e. it decreases by 2.6
percentage points. This diﬀerence is partly due to the fact that medium-skill jobs
have a much lower job separation rate than low-skill jobs, and partly due to the
higher exit rate out of unemployment for medium-skill workers. Subsequently, it
can be deduced that the average annual income (which is a weighted average of b
and the average wage) increases by 17640. This exceeds the eﬀect on the average
wage, despite the fact that income in unemployment is independent of skill level.
This is of course due to the dominating reduction of the average amount of time
spent unemployed.
5.2.4 Simulation of the KL
Suppose that the KL reduces the proportion of low-skill workers from p1 = .648
to .60 and then to .55 and increases the proportion of medium-skill workers
from p2 = .352 to .40 and then to .45. We feel that these capture the magni-
tude of the change in skill levels that the KL could potentially produce. Recall
that the other structural parameters are ﬁxed to the values obtained above, i.e.,
r =0 .05,b = 80000,m(θ)=5 θ.5,δ 1 =0 .179,δ 2 =0 .053,c 1 = 542650,c 2 =
1069400,s 1 = 733320,s 2 = 1313930. In Appendix 3 we derive the equations that
must be solved for the simulation.
Simulation with p1 = .6 and p2 = .4
θ m(θ) u u1 u2 γ1 γ2 φ1 φ2
.18018 2.1224 .078 .092 .056 .71017 .28983 .82873 .17127
e11 e21 e22 w11 w21 w22
.54458 .22225 .15513 176790 188270 212270
Simulation with p1 = .55 and p2 = .45
θ m(θ) u u1 u2 γ1 γ2 φ1 φ2
.17356 2.083 .079 .099 .053 .69537 .30463 .77804 .22196
e11 e21 e22 w11 w21 w22
.49530 .21698 .20906 175890 190400 214400
33We ﬁrst discuss the equilibrium eﬀects on aggregate outcomes and then the
equilibrium eﬀects at the individual level.
The results show that a program such as KL that moves workers from low to
medium skills can have important equilibrium eﬀects. The ﬁrst-order equilibrium
eﬀect comes via the equilibrium change in job composition. As the fraction of
medium-skill workers in the labor force increases, the fraction of vacancies tailored
towards those workers increases commensurately. In our simulations, increases in
p2 translate almost one-for-one into increases in φ2. The measure of low-skill
workers employed in low-skill jobs (e11) also falls by about the same amount.
There is a slight decrease in the measure of medium-skill workers employed in
low-skill jobs (e21). On the one hand, there are more medium-skill workers; on the
other hand, there are fewer low-skill jobs. In our simulations, the second eﬀect
dominates slightly. Finally, the increase in the measure of medium-skill workers
employed in medium-skill jobs increases by about the same amount as the fraction
p2 of medium-skilled workers does.
The eﬀect of a change in skill composition on aggregate unemployment is small.
This is partly because the change in labor market tightness is small. The variable θ
falls slightly, meaning that workers in general take a bit longer to locate a vacancy.
However, there are important distributional eﬀects on unemployment across the
two skill categories. There are more medium-skill workers, and these workers on
average ﬁnd jobs more quickly and on average retain them longer than low-skill
workers do. Unemployment even decreases among the fraction of medium-skill
workers who have always been medium-skill, because, even though m(θ) falls
slightly, there are relatively more medium-skill jobs which are on average kept
longer. At the same time, the remaining low-skill workers have more diﬃculty
ﬁnding a job than they did before the policy change. The reason is again the
shift in job composition – relatively fewer low-skill vacancies are being opened
(φ1 falls). The fraction of unemployment accounted for by medium-skill workers,
γ2, increases simply because there are now more medium-skill workers.
There is also a clear eﬀect on the distribution of wages. The wages of low-skill
workers fall whereas the wages of medium-skill workers increase on both low- and
medium-skill jobs. This reﬂects the change in unemployment values for the two
worker types. The value of unemployment among low-skill workers falls because
these workers now take longer on average to ﬁnd a job; the value of unemployment
among medium-skill workers increases because these workers now face a better
mix of job opportunities.
The top panel of Table 5 summarizes the average wage, employment, and
income outcomes, before and after KL, and by skill level. These are subsequently
34Table 5: Equilibrium average treatment eﬀects if KL changes the relative measures
of low and medium skilled from 0.65 to 0.55 and from 0.35 to 0.45, respectively.
outcome measure: average employment average
wage probability income
(a) pre-KL, low skill 178 0.914 169
(b) pre-KL, medium skill 194 0.940 187
(c) post-KL, low skill 176 0.901 166
(d) post-KL, medium skill 202 0.947 196
“partial” treatment eﬀect on treated: b minus a 16 0.026 18
equil. change for remaining low skilled: c − a –2 -0.013 -3
equil. change for remaining medium skilled: d − b 8 0.007 9
equil. change for treated: d − a 24 0.033 27
equil. treatment eﬀect: (d − a) − (c − a) 26 0.046 29
Note: monetary variables are annual averages in 1000 SEK (1996 level).
used to quantify the changes in outcomes for those who stay low skilled, those
who stay medium skilled, and those whose skills are upgraded, in the bottom
panel of the table. For completeness we also list the “partial” eﬀects discussed in
Subsection 5.2.3. The last row of Table 5 gives the the eﬀects on the outcomes for
the low-skill individuals whose skills are actually upgraded, by comparing them
to the post-program outcomes of the individuals whose skills are not upgraded.
These are the counterparts of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences and the conditional pro-
bit analysis in Section 4. They may be called the average equilibrium treatment
eﬀects on the treated.
The rows in the top panel of the table display the same ranking for each
outcome measure: c<a<b<d . This conﬁrms for each outcome measure that
the treated gain most from the program. Those who have always been medium
skilled also beneﬁt, whereas the remaining low skilled suﬀer. Moreover, the equi-
librium eﬀects are always a factor 1.5 to 2 times larger than the “partial” eﬀects.
35Again, this is because the program generates an equilibrium response of the skill
distribution of vacancies towards the higher skill. In this sense, the program has
a multiplier eﬀect at the aggregate level.
To what extent do the above treatment eﬀects agree to the microeconomet-
ric results in Section 4? The simulated eﬀect on employment is in agreement to
the econometric results for young men. However, the ﬁnding that the average
“partial” eﬀect on wages is positive and bounded from above by the average
equilibrium eﬀect on wages is harder to reconcile with the econometric results.
We can relate this to the discussion at the end of Section 4. The post-program-
participation year 2000 used in the microeconometric analysis lies only 3 years
after the launch of the KL program and is in the middle of the era during which
KL ran. In 2000, not enough time had passed to allow the full eﬀects of the
program to come to fruition. Indeed, in 2000, individuals whose skills were up-
graded may not even have had enough time to leave their post-program dip.
Employment eﬀects may reveal themselves earlier than wage eﬀects if the wage
setting institutions do not allow for swift wage adjustments. Also, employers with
medium-skill vacancies may initially discriminate against treated workers, while
the latter may initially be preferred over low-skill applicants by employers with
low-skill vacancies.8
Insofar as the economy is able to adjust, our model predicts that the upgrading
of the skills of a large fraction of the low-skill work force eventually (in steady-
state equilibrium) leads to an economy with more medium-skill jobs and fewer
low-skill jobs, with wage increases for those who make the skill upgrade.
6 Conclusions
The econometric analysis provides evidence of a positive employment eﬀect for
young men. This is remarkable in the sense that (i) training programs have usually
been found to be ineﬀective in raising the employment probability, and (ii)i fa
program works then typically it works for women and not for men. It seems that
men who were hurt by the recession in the early 1990s are highly represented
among the male participants, and they beneﬁted from KL to get back to work –
8Of course, the simulated equilibrium wage eﬀects may be aﬀected by misspeciﬁcation of the
equilibrium model. An equilibrium model with skill heterogeneity along the lines of Heckman,
Lochner and Taber (1998), for instance, would give diﬀerent results because of the diﬀerent
way in which the production technology is modeled. In Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), a
rise in tuition subsidies for college students increases the supply of college graduates, but this
in turn reduces their wages.
36in accordance to the objective of modern adult education. However, we do not ﬁnd
an average income eﬀect. This is at odds with the objective of the program to raise
worker skills and thereby worker productivity and wages. Also, the equilibrium
calibration evaluation predicts a positive eﬀect. We conclude that the sample size
on individual incomes among treated may be too small. Also, the econometric
analysis may under-estimate the average income eﬀect, because of the gain in
work experience in the control groups, and/or because the post-program year is
too close to the treatment period.
For women we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects at all. It seems that female par-
ticipants were and are similar to non-participants. Perhaps the participation of
older female individuals at adult education courses is not directly inspired by
labor-market prospects but rather by the consumption value of the education.
Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (2003) ﬁnd that the returns among older indi-
viduals depend very strongly on the type of course followed. It would be useful
to obtain data with more individual and course characteristics to study the eﬀect
heterogeneity, and to subsequently design a proﬁling mechanism to sort out those
older individuals and courses for whom the eﬀect is likely to be positive. More
in general, future research should be based on larger samples of treated, along
with better micro data on wages. Moreover, the present study has shown that
the evaluation of adult education program participation would beneﬁt from data
covering a time span of decades rather than years. In particular, with more recent
post-program years, a more comprehensive picture of the program eﬀects should
be possible.
The theoretical analysis of an equilibrium search model with heterogeneity,
along with the calibration of the model and the simulation of the policy change,
provide some interesting insights into the equilibrium eﬀects of the program.
Most notably, the program generates an equilibrium response of the skill distri-
bution of vacancies towards the higher skill. In the simulation, as the fraction of
medium-skill workers in the labor force increases at the expense of the fraction
of low-skill workers, the fraction of vacancies tailored towards the medium-skill
workers increases commensurately, almost one-for-one. For each outcome mea-
sure, the treated gain most from the program. Those who have always been
medium skilled also beneﬁt, whereas those who remain low skilled suﬀer. More-
over, the equilibrium eﬀects are always a factor 1.5 to 2 times larger than the
“partial” eﬀects.
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Appendix 1.Miscellaneous estimation results
Table 6: Estimates of the average treatment eﬀects on the treated, concerning
participation in KOMVUX in 97-II, using 1994 and 2000 as pre- and post-program
years and annual income as outcome measure (in 1000 SEK in the year 2000;
trimmed income data).
type of individual ATET (standard error) ntreated ncontrol
Male, aged 25–40 -8.0 (13) 25 3729
Female, aged 25–40 6.3 (8) 46 4427
Female, aged 41–55 4.1 (9) 33 7162
Appendix 2.Calibration of the ex-post segmentation equi-
librium
In an ex post segmentation equilibrium, there is no steady-state condition for the
ﬂows of medium-skill workers in and out of low-skill jobs. We therefore assume
that β =0 .5. The inequalities on U are now:
s1 − c1 <r U (s2)
s1 − c1 ≥ rU(s1)
s2 − c2 ≥ rU(s2).




m(θ)=4 .062 φ1 = .468 φ2 = .532
δ1 δ2 e11 e22
.179 .139 .592 .331
41Step 2 yields:
s1 − c1 s2 − c2 rU(s1) rU(s2)
188100 207480 167100 188520
Note that s1 − c<r U(s2), which is consistent with ex post segmentation.
Finally, in this case, m(θ)=4 .062, so θ = .660 and
m(θ)
θ
=6 .15. The zero-
value conditions imply:
θ c1 c2 s1 s2
.660 204310 85203 392410 292683
Clearly, the cost and productivity parameters are in the wrong order.
Appendix 3.Simulation equations
The two steady-state equations each equate the ﬂow into and out of unemploy-
ment for one of the skill levels. These two steady-state equations are








where φ2 =1− φ1 and γ1 =1− γ2 − γ3.





bR1R2 + βm(θ)[φ1R2S1 + φ2R1S2]
R1R2 + βm(θ)(φ1R2 + φ2R1)
.
where S1 = s1 − c1, and S2 = s2 − c2,R 1 = r + δ1, and R2 = r + δ2.





(1 − β)[S1 − rU(s1)]
R1
−V (s1)]+γ2[







(1 − β)S2 − rU(s2)]
R2
− V (s2)]







(S1 − b)R1R2 + βm(θ)φ2R1(S1 − S2)





(S2 − b)R1R2 + βm(θ)φ1R2(S2 − S1)
R1R2 + βm(θ)(φ1R2 + φ2R1)
]
These two equations along with the two steady-state equations are the equations
that must be solved for the equilibrium. After solving for the equilibrium, the
wages can be found by using the wage equations
w(s1,s 1)=βS1 +( 1− β)rU(s1)
w(s2,s 1)=βS1 +( 1− β)rU(s2)
w(s2,s 2)=βS2 +( 1− β)rU(s2)
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